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FAMILY LAW: JURISDICTION TO IMPOSE RESTITUTION IN CHILD ABUSE CASE 
 
Summary 
 
 In a child abuse case, where a family court has previously imposed an obligation on the 
defendant for the costs of supporting a child placed in the care of social services, the Supreme 
Court of Nevada determined the district court has jurisdiction to grant restitution to the State for 
the cost of such child care but must be offset the restitution amount by the amount of the support 
obligation imposed by the family court.  
 
Background 
 
 Following Larry Major’s arrest for child abuse, the State placed his daughter in the 
custody of Washoe County Social Services (Social Services). In a family court hearing, Major 
was ordered to pay child support of $100.00 per month, directly to Social Services. Upon 
Major’s guilty plea to one felony count of child abuse, Social Services sought restitution in the 
amount of $20,362.07. Ida Peeks, a fiscal compliance officer for Social Services, testified to 
establish the amount of restitution, based on the amount it charges other agencies for the care of 
children placed in Kids Kottage, where Social Services housed Major’s Daughter. Peeks further 
testified Social Services could receive reimbursement for the cost of care from the federal 
government for children that meet certain eligibility requirements. However, Peeks did not know 
whether Major’s daughter met these requirements, or if Social Services had received any 
reimbursement for her care.  
 The district court concluded that the Family Court’s order did not affect the jurisdiction 
of the district court as to its criminal restitution order, and ordered major to pay the full 
restitution sought less $700 to reflect the amount already paid to Social Services.  
 
Discussion 
 
The district court had jurisdiction to order Major to pay restitution 
 
 Major argued the district court lacked jurisdiction to order him to pay restitution because 
the family court previously ordered him to pay $100.00 per month for the cost of the care. On an 
issue of first appeal, the supreme court disagreed with Major’s characterization of the restitution 
as “modifying or reviewing the family court’s support order.” The supreme court has previously 
held “family court judges are district court judges with authority to preside over matters outside 
the family court division’s jurisdiction.”2 Pursuant to NRS 176.033(1)(c), a sentencing court may 
award restitution to the victims of a crime upon a criminal conviction. 3  Thus, despite the fact 
district courts lack jurisdiction to review or modify actions of other district courts4, here, the 
district court’s order imposing restitution did not constitute a review or modification of the 
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family court’s support obligation. That is, although a family court judge has the same authority 
as a district court judge, NRS 176.033(1)(c) limits the power of a district court judge to award 
restitution to victims of crimes to the sentencing phase of a criminal proceeding5.  
 Restitution is granted to compensate a victim for costs arising from a defendant’s 
criminal act.6 Although the circumstances in which the state may be considered a victim are 
limited, the supreme court has previously held that the State was a victim for purposes of 
awarding restitution when incurring costs for medical and foster care of a child after the 
defendant was convicted of child abuse.7    
 Ultimately, the district court has jurisdiction to grant restitution to the state for the total 
cost imposed on it as a result of Major’s criminal act, so long as the district court offsets the 
restitution amount by the amount of the support obligation. In this case, the restitution amount of 
$19,662.07 was proper, as the court deducted the $700.00 Major had paid under the family 
court’s order, from the original restitution amount of $20,362.07.  
 
Sufficient evidence supports the restitution award 
 
 Major argues in the alternative that the court should remand for a hearing to establish the 
actual cost of care for his daughter. The district court found the evidence presented by Social 
Services sufficient and required social services to notify the district court if they received a 
reimbursement from the federal government,  at which time, the district court would amend the 
restitution order to reflect that reimbursement. Although the Supreme Court has cautioned 
sentencing courts to “rely on reliable and accurate evidence in setting restitution,” a defendant is 
not entitled to a full evidentiary hearing at sentencing.8 Therefore, “so long as the record does not 
demonstrate prejudice resulting from consideration of information or accusations founded on 
facts supported only by impalpable or highly suspect evidence”, the court will not interfere with 
the sentencing imposed.9  
 
Conclusion 
  
 NRS 176.033(1)(c) limits the power of a district court to grant restitution to the 
sentencing phase of a criminal proceeding10, thus, the district court was within its jurisdiction 
when it granted restitution, offset by the amount paid under the family court’s order, to the State. 
The court found the State to be a victim in this case, and further emphasized a defendant is not 
entitled to a full evidentiary hearing at sentencing. As such, without evidence in the record of 
prejudice resulting from consideration of improper information, the court will not interfere with 
the sentence imposed by the district court. Therefore, the judgment of conviction is affirmed. 
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